Domestic origination to international termination country set logic

ABSTRACT

A method and device for preventing fraud in international calls in a long-distance telecommunications system, where selected customers can avoid fraud control blocks and greater granularity is achieved in blocking international destinations. In the method and device, an override flag is created in the records of the Billing Number Screening (BNS) database. When a call is made using a billing number whose corresponding record has the override flag set, the call is not stopped by fraud control blocks on certain international destinations. In addition, international destinations can be blocked with greater specificity because a Country Set Logic (CSET) field is added to the International City Code Database. The addition of CSET to this database allows particular international city destinations to be blocked from certain origin points.

BACKGROUND

This application is a continuation of U.S. patent application Ser. No.09/859,296, filed May 17, 2001, entitled “DOMESTIC ORIGINATION TOINTERNATIONAL TERMINATION COUNTRY SET LOGIC”, now U.S. Pat. No.6,618,475, which has a common assignee and inventorship to the presentapplication, and the above noted patent application, is incorporated byreference in its entirety.

1. Technological Field

The present application relates generally to fraud control intelecommunications systems and, in particular, to preventing fraud incalls from a domestic origin point to an international terminating pointin a long distance telecommunications network.

2. Description of the Related Art

The telecommunications industry has experienced significant changes inthe way that customers are billed for their telephone calls. From theonce simple method of billing the originating caller, many methods havebeen developed, allowing greater flexibility for the telecommunicationscustomer. A predominant method for making telephone calls away from homeor the office is by utilizing the telephone calling card to charge thecall.

Calling card customers may use any telephone facility, including publicfacilities, to make a call that will be charged to their account. Theprocess of making calls using a calling card typically includes dialingan “800” number, waiting for an audio prompt, and then entering anaccount number and a Personal Identification Number (PIN) into atelephone key pad device. The “800” (and now “888”) number phone callsare one type of a category of phone calls called “special service”calls. These special service calls, which include “700”, “800/888”, and“900” number calls, allow contemporary telecommunications networks toprovide many services beyond direct distance dialing. It is the longdistance carriers that provide this special service call processing,which allows for toll-free calls, calling card calls, special ratecalls, etc.

Following the example of a calling card call, once the account numberand PIN have been entered, the calling card customer can make one ormore calls from whatever location the customer is dialing in from. Thesecalls are subsequently charged to the customer's calling card account.Calling cards can also be used to avoid having to pay additionalsurcharges when making calls from certain public facilities such ashotels and telephone booths.

As with many new technologies, the ease and flexibility of the use ofcalling cards has led to abuse, and has consequently brought about newtypes of fraud. Calling card fraud costs businesses (and consumers)millions of dollars annually. Current security mechanisms, whileeffective, are not fail-safe, and protection mechanisms for consumersand businesses require improvement to stem these fraud-related losses.

There is a virtual underground industry in stolen calling cards andauthorization codes. The multitude of ways that calling cards andauthorization numbers find their way into unscrupulous hands need not bediscussed here, but suffice it to say there is no end to the ingenuityof the criminal mind. One example of calling card fraud is the techniqueof “surfing” banks of public telephones, such as are at airports.Criminals “surf” by looking over the shoulders of legitimate card usersas they key in the account number and PIN. Then they sell or distributethese numbers and rampant fraud results. In some cases, a single accountmay incur charges in excess of $100,000 in a single weekend. Callingcard fraud and other forms of fraudulent use present pervasive problemsfor telephone carriers, particularly long distance carriers.

One method of fraud control is to simply remove calling card numbersagainst which it is suspected that fraudulent calls are being charged.In order to recognize fraudulent calls, a “billing number”—a billingproduct and an account number, such as a calling card, pre-paid phonecard, etc.—is monitored over time. For example, where the number ofdomestic calls placed within a certain amount of time using the samebilling number exceeds a certain threshold, an alert is generated.International calls may have a lower threshold so that fewer callswithin the time period generate an alert. In addition, the threshold maybe further adjusted for calls to countries where a high percentage offraudulent calls are directed.

Another method of fraud control is to identify particular origin pointsthat are linked to suspicious activity and to block certain calls fromthose particular origin points. For example, a large number of longduration calls to China may be generated from an exchange in Manhattan.This would generate a threshold alert, which is typically sent to afraud analyst. A fraud analyst would be stationed at a fraud controlconsole 100, as shown in FIG. 1. The fraud analyst analyzes the alertand the history of that exchange in order to determine whether or not toblock that exchange from calling China. If the fraud analyst decidesthat there is fraudulent activity, he sets up a block on that exchangewhich will prevent subsequent calls to China or other internationaldestinations that the fraud analyst selects.

The present invention concerns this type of blockage and, in particular,blocks on special service calls that originate domestically andterminate internationally. An example of this type of special servicecall is shown with reference to FIG. 1. The caller, using telephone 111,makes a calling card call by dialing a number in the format of1-NPA-NXX-XXXX. NPA stands for Number Plan Area, often referred to asthe “area code”, which defines the geographic region of the number; NXXis the terminating exchange, typically identifying a switch within thegeographic region; and XXXX is the unique station designation. For mostcalling cards, the number will take the form 1-800-NXX-XXXX, where the“800” signifies that the call is a special service call, rather than ageographic region. The call is routed through Local Exchange Carrier(LEC) 120. LEC refers to local telephone companies, such as the RegionalBell Operating Companies (RBOCs), which provide local transmissionservices for their customers. Because of the 1-800 format of the dialednumber, the routers in the LEC will forward the call to the network ofthe appropriate long distance carrier (or Inter-Exchange Carrier IXC)130. Special service telephone calls, such as “800” number calls, areprovided by IXCs, such as MCI-Worldcom.

Returning to our call, after switching through LEC switches 122 and 124,the “800” number is routed from POP (Point-of-Presence) switch 125 intothe IXC 130, and then through IXC switches 131 and 136, to a bridgeswitch 135. The purpose of the bridge switch 135 is to receive callsfrom the IXC network and bridge them to the Automatic Call Distributor(ACD) 140 and, ultimately, into the Intelligent Services Networkplatform (ISN) 150. Because special service calls require special callprocessing, they are typically routed to a call processing platform,such as the ISN platform 150. There are a number of ISNs within the IXC,but, for the purpose of understanding the present invention, one ISNwill suffice.

An exemplary and simplified diagram of the ISN platform 150 will now bedescribed with reference to FIG. 2. The ACD 140 is under the directcontrol of the Application Processor APP 156, which is a general purposecomputer that functions as the central point for call routing control inthe ISN 150. When the “800” number call arrives at the ACD 140, the ACD140 makes a request to the APP 156 for directions as to how the callshould be handled. Such a request would usually be accompanied byinformation concerning the call; i.e. the Automatic Number Identifier(ANI) of the caller and the destination number of the call. The APP 156would recognize by the “800” prefix of the destination number that thecall is a special services call and, consequently, the APP 156 wouldinstruct the ACD 140 to deliver the call to the appropriate queue. Inthis case, assuming that the call is to a calling card “800” number, thecall would queue up to the Automatic Response Unit (ARU) 152. The ARU152 comprises two components, one to process the call, the other toprompt the caller with a voice response system. It is the ARU 152 thatwill ask the caller for the required final destination number, callingcard number, and PIN. When a live operator is required, the call isrouted to the Manual Telecommunications Operator Console (MTOC) 154.Whether the call is routed to the ARU 152 or the MTOC 154, the sameinformational decisions will have to be made. In other words, regardlessof whether it is entered by the operator at the MTOC 154 or by thecaller at her telephone 111 to the ARU 152, items such as the callingcard account number will have to be entered.

During the course of servicing a call, the need often arises to “park” acall on the ACD 140. When a call is parked on the ACD 140, the call isactive, i.e., there is a party on the call with an established voicechannel connected to the ACD 140. The call is monitored and maintainedat the ACD. Once a call is parked at the ACD, it is no longer underdirect control of either the ARU 152 or the MTOC 154 that parked thecall. This allows the facilities at the ISN 150 to be freed up toperform other tasks or services. When call processing is completed, andthe call is authorized and validated, the call is released from the ACD140 and the bridge switch 135 to the automated switching of the IXCnetwork 130. As shown on FIG. 1, the call is then connected through IXCswitch 137 to a telephone 199 in China.

Now, a simplified and exemplary call processing procedure will bedescribed with reference to FIGS. 2, 3A, and 3B. Many steps that arerequired for call processing have been eliminated from the descriptionas unnecessary for the understanding of Country Set Logic. Assuming thatthe special services call is a calling card call from a domestic originto an international destination, the caller needs to enter her accountnumber, PIN, and the terminating ANI. It is assumed that all of thisdata is input before the procedure begins, but, as one skilled in therelevant art would know, some of the data could just as well be enteredduring the procedure. Following this example, once input is complete,the access code is looked up in an access-level database, such as theAuthorization Property Database (AUTH PROP) 168, at step 300 in FIG. 3A.The access code is the original 1-800-NXX-XXXX dialed in to accessspecial services, and an access-level database is a database keyed tothe various access codes.

Records in the Authorization Property Database 168 contain various itemskeyed to the access code, including operator scripts, billing products,and options. The AUTH PROP records also contain a field for Country SetLogic in order to indicate limitations on international destinations.Basically, Country Set Logic consists of this extra field where a termin the form CSETX (where X represents a number from 1 to 999) can beplaced. For example, the access code “1-800-555-6543” might contain“CSET16” in its Country Set field (CSET). This means that, when thedestination number is looked up in the international database, if theterm “CSET16” appears in the international database, the call will beblocked. In step 305 of FIG. 3A, it is determined whether there is anaccess-level CSET term in the AUTH PROP 168. If there is, the CSET termis saved in step 307. If either there is no CSET term in step 305, orafter the CSET term is stored in step 307, the call processing continuesat step 310.

At step 310, the billing number associated with the customer account islooked up in the Billed Number Screening (BNS) database 160. The BNScontains records keyed by billing numbers and has flags to indicatevarious limitations on particular billing numbers. It is determinedwhether the billing number is flagged in step 315. If the billing numberis flagged, the call may be re-routed to an MTOC 154, a fraud analyst ata fraud console 100, or simply disconnected. If the billing number isnot flagged in step 315, the exchange of the originating ANI (the prefixNPA-NXX of the originating number) is looked up in an exchange-leveldatabase, such as the Exchange Master (X-MASTER) database 162, in step320. The X-MASTER has records keyed on the various NPA-NXXs and alsoincludes flags that indicate various limitations on particularexchanges. The records in the X-MASTER also contain a CSET field inorder to indicate limitations on international destinations. In the samemanner as the access-level database, if the originating exchange NPA-NXXcontains “CSET32” in its CSET field and the term “CSET32” appears in theinternational database, the call will be blocked.

The CSET logic is the primary focus for the rest of this application.With this in mind, the X-MASTER 162 and other databases discussed herewould likely be accessed for other purposes, such as viewing other flagsand fields. For example, X-MASTER 162, like the BNS 160 in step 310, istypically accessed to determine if there are other blocking flags on theoriginating exchange. This step, and others, have been left out asextraneous to an understanding of Country Set logic and the presentinvention.

Returning to the call processing procedure, in step 325, it isdetermined whether there is a CSET term in the particular NPA-NXX recordin X-MASTER 162. If there is, the CSET term is saved in step 327. Instep 327, if there was a previously stored access-level CSET, it isdeleted and replaced with the exchange-level CSET. This establishesgreater granularity, because the exchange-level is much narrower thanthe access-level. If either there is no CSET term in step 325, or afterthe CSET term is stored in step 327, the call processing continues atstep 330.

In step 330, the originating ANI is looked up in an ANI-level database,such as the ANI Property database (ANI PROP) 169. The ANI PROP 169contains records keyed to ANIs, and the records contain flags, fields,and other information unique to that ANI. This provides the greatestgranularity, because a particular payphone can be blocked using anANI-level database. There is also a CSET field in the ANI PROP 169records and, in step 335, it is determined whether there is a CSET termin the originating ANI's record in the ANI PROP 169. If there is, theCSET term is saved in step 337. In step 337, if there was a previouslystored access- or exchange-level CSET, it is deleted and replaced withthe ANI-level CSET.

Since the focus is on the CSET logic, if there is either no CSET term instep 335, or after the CSET term is stored in step 337, the procedurejumps to step 350 on FIG. 3B, leaving out many call processing details.In step 350, the destination number is checked against the InternationalCountry Code Database (INTERNAT'L COUNTRY) 164. The INTERNAT'L COUNTRYhas records keyed on the various international country codes and alsoincludes flags that indicate various limitations on the particularcountries. The records in the INTERNAT'L COUNTRY also contain a fieldfor Country Set Logic in order to indicate limitations on internationaldestinations. In step 355, it is determined whether there is a matchingCSET in the INTERNAT'L COUNTRY. If there is a matching CSET in step 355,the call is blocked. If not, call processing continues until completion.During the continuation of call processing, other databases, includingthe International City Code (INTERNAT'L CITY) database 166, areaccessed.

This method is effective in eliminating fraudulent calls made fromorigin points that have been recognized as generating a large amount offraudulent calls to particular international destinations. Typically,fraud control 100 maintains a fraud-to-revenue ratio in relation toparticular exchanges calling particular countries. Once thisfraud-to-revenue ratio reaches a certain threshold, some form of CSETlogic is placed on the originating exchange/destination countrycombination. This type of block makes sense because most hackers willmove from phone to phone within a certain area. Thus, the conventionalmethod eliminates a great deal of fraud; however, it is troublesome tolegitimate callers within that exchange. A calling card customer makinga non-fraudulent call within that exchange will be blocked from callingthat international destination. In addition, blocking the entire countrywill sometimes cast a much larger net than is needed for the task.

Therefore, there is a need to allow legitimate callers to make callsfrom blocked exchanges to international destinations. In addition, thereis a need to permit finer granularity in blocking calls to internationaldestinations.

SUMMARY

One object of this invention is to provide a system and method ofallowing legitimate callers to make calls from areas blocked fromcalling certain international destinations in a telecommunicationsnetwork.

Another object of this invention is to provide a system and a method foroverriding fraud control blocks on exchanges or billing products fromcalling certain international destinations in a telecommunicationsnetwork.

Yet another object of this invention is to provide a system and a methodfor blocking billing products, exchanges, or ANIs from calling certaininternational cities in a telecommunications network.

To accomplish the above and other objects, a system and method forpreventing fraud on international special service calls in a longdistance telecommunication system is disclosed. In one aspect of thissystem and method, an override flag is created in the records of theBilling Number Screening (BNS) database so that selected customers canoverride fraud control blocks. When a call is made using a billingnumber whose corresponding record has the override flag set, the call isnot stopped by fraud control blocks on certain internationaldestinations. In another aspect of the system and method, internationaldestinations can be blocked with greater specificity because a CountrySet Logic (CSET) field is added to the International City Code Database.The addition of CSET to this database allows particular internationalcity destinations to be blocked from certain origin points.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE FIGURES

The foregoing and other objects, aspects and advantages will be betterunderstood from the following detailed description of a preferredembodiment as illustrated in the following drawings. In the drawings,like reference numbers indicate identical or functionally similarelements.

FIG. 1 is a schematic diagram of a long distance telephone system,according to the prior art;

FIG. 2 is a schematic diagram of an exemplary and simplified callprocessing platform with associated fraud control system, according tothe prior art;

FIGS. 3A and 3B make up a flowchart of the CSET Logic call processingprocedure, according to the prior art; and

FIGS. 4A and 4B make up a flowchart of a CSET Logic call processingprocedure, according to the preferred embodiment of the present systemand method.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE PREFERRED EMBODIMENTS

In the following description, the term “network” is a short-handdescription of the conglomeration of databases, trunk and telephonelines, routers, switches, protocols, and computers that are required tomake a telecommunications network.

In short, the preferred embodiment of the present system and methodallows overrides of CSET Logic blocks and establishes greatergranularity for the international areas being blocked. In one aspect, anoverride flag is added to the BNS so that particular billing numberswill not be blocked by some of the CSET Logic. In another aspect, CSETlogic is added to an International City Code database already residentin the ISN platform.

An exemplary and simplified international special service callprocessing procedure according to the preferred embodiment of thepresent invention will be described with reference to FIGS. 4A and 4B.The special service calls considered here all have a domesticorigination. As stated above, many steps that are required for callprocessing have been eliminated from the description as unnecessary forthe understanding of the preferred embodiment of the present invention.

In a similar manner to what was described above, the access code islooked up in an access-level database, such as the AuthorizationProperty Database (AUTH PROP) 168, at step 400 in FIG. 4A. In step 405,it is determined whether there is an access-level CSET term in the AUTHPROP 168. If there is, the CSET term is saved in step 407. If eitherthere is no CSET term in step 405, or after the CSET term is stored instep 407, the billing number associated with the customer account islooked up in the BNS 160 at step 410. In step 415, it is determinedwhether the billing product is flagged for fraud. If the billing numberis flagged, the call will be re-routed or simply disconnected.

If the billing number is not flagged in step 415, it is determinedwhether an override flag is set in step 417. The override flag can beset either by a fraud analyst at the fraud control console 100 or by anautomated program at the fraud control console 100. When either thefraud analyst or automated program determines that the billing number iswith a customer whose past security and account history indicates a lowrisk for fraudulent behavior, they will set the override flag in the BNS160. If it is determined that the override flag is set in step 417, anyaccess-level CSET term that was saved in step 407 is deleted in step419. Then, the call processing procedure jumps to step 430, where theoriginating ANI is looked up in the ANI PROP 169. This allows thelow-risk customer to call either from blocked exchanges, or with ablocked access code or billing product, while still permitting fraudcontrol 100 to block particular high-risk ANIs from making calls tocertain international destinations. Although the procedure “jumps” overthe X-MASTER look-up step to the ANI PROP look-up step 430, it should benoted that that the X-MASTER 162 is typically still accessed during callprocessing, just not for CSET logic. In addition, another embodiment ofthe present invention would allow a “super” flag that would alsooverride the ANI-level CSET Logic. This means that there may be CSETterms in some of the other databases, but they will be ignored becauseof the customer's special classification.

If it is determined that the override flag is not set in step 417, theexchange of the originating ANI is looked up in the X-MASTER database162 in step 420. In step 425, it is determined whether there is a CSETterm in the X-MASTER 162. If there is one or more CSET terms, the CSETterm(s) is saved in step 427. In step 427, if there was a previouslystored access-level CSET, it is deleted and replaced with theexchange-level CSET. If either there is no CSET term in step 425, orafter the CSET term is stored in step 427, the call processing continuesat step 430.

At step 430, the originating ANI is looked up in the ANI PROP 169. Afteraccessing the originating ANI record in the ANI PROP 169 in step 430, itis determined whether the originating ANI has one or more CSET terms instep 435. If there is one or more CSET terms in step 435, the CSET termis saved in step 437. In step 437, if there was a previously storedaccess-level or exchange-level CSET, it is deleted and replaced with theANI-level CSET. If either there is no CSET term in step 435, or afterthe CSET term is stored in step 437, the procedure jumps to step 450 inFIG. 4B. The destination number is looked up in the INTERNAT'L COUNTRY164 at step 450. In step 455, it is determined whether there is amatching CSET in the INTERNAT'L COUNTRY. If there is a matching CSET instep 455, the call is blocked.

If there is no matching CSET in step 455, call processing continues atstep 460, where the destination number is looked up in the InternationalCity Code Database (INTERNAT'L CITY) 166. The INTERNAT'L CITY 166 hasrecords keyed on the various international city codes and also includesflags that indicate various limitations on the particular internationalcities. In the preferred embodiment of the present invention, therecords in the INTERNAT'L CITY 166 also contain a field for Country SetLogic in order to indicate limitations on international cities. In thepreferred embodiment, the INTERNAT'L CITY 166 is always accessed forspecial service international calls, so checking for matching CSET logicadds little processing time to the procedure. In step 465, it isdetermined whether there is a matching CSET in the INTERNAT'L CITY 166.If there is a matching CSET in step 465, the call is blocked. If not,call processing is continued to completion.

The CSET Logic addition to the INTERNAT'L CITY 166 provides greatergranularity in blocking international destinations. It also providesgreater flexibility. For instance, the term “CSET978” might be in theINTERNAT'L COUNTRY 164 record for Afghanistan, and in the INTERNAT'LCITY 166 records for Beirut and Istanbul. Thus, any internationalspecial service calls with that CSET logic would be blocked from thosedestinations. In another embodiment, the CSET Logic is applied tosequence numbers in the INTERNAT'L COUNTRY 164. For example, the UnitedKingdom may be Country Code 14 (CC14), and its constituent countries,England, Scotland, and Northern Ireland, have sequence numbers, such as1, 2, and 3, within CC14. Adding the CSET Logic to individual sequencenumbers would also increase granularity, allowing Scotland to be blockedwithout blocking the rest of the United Kingdom.

As one skilled in the relevant art would recognize, many elements of atelecommunications network have been left out in order not to obscurethe invention in details unnecessary to the understanding of the presentinvention. In addition, although the above-described embodiment is thepreferred embodiment, many modifications would be obvious to one skilledin the art.

While the present invention has been described with respect to a certainpreferred embodiment, it should be understood that the invention is notlimited to this particular embodiment, but, on the contrary, theinvention is intended to cover all modifications, equivalents, andalternatives falling within the spirit and scope of the invention asdefined by the appended claims.

1. A method for suppressing a fraud control block in atelecommunications system, comprising the steps of: maintaining at leastone record associated with a customer account; adding an override flagfield to each of the at least one record; determining if an overrideflag is set in a record of the at least one record, when said record isaccessed during call processing of a call using a customer accountassociated with said record; overriding one or more fraud control blockson an exchange blocked from processing the call if it is determined thatthe override flag is set; and if overriding the one or more fraudcontrol blocks, blocking the call based on an originating number of thecall.
 2. The method as recited in claim 1, wherein the at least onerecord in the maintaining step is maintained in a Billed NumberScreening (BNS) database.
 3. The method as recited in claim 1, whereinthe call in the determining step is a special service call.
 4. Themethod as recited in claim 3, wherein the special service call is aninternational call.
 5. A device for suppressing a fraud control block ina telecommunications system, comprising: a database for maintaining atleast one record associated with a customer account and having anoverride flag; means for determining if the override flag is set in arecord of the at least one record, when said record is accessed duringcall processing of a call using a customer account associated with saidrecord; means for overriding one or more fraud control blocks on anexchange blocked from processing the call if the determining meansdetermines that the override flag is set; and means for blocking thecall based on an originating number of the call, if the overriding meansoverrides the one or more fraud control blocks.
 6. The device as recitedin claim 5, wherein the database is a Billing Number Screening (BNS)database.
 7. The device as recited in claim 5, wherein the call is aspecial service call, and further wherein the means for determining andthe means for overriding comprises a call processing platform.
 8. Amethod of fraud control for a call from an originating number to aninternational destination, comprising: overriding a call block to theinternational destination applied at an exchange level of theoriginating number, based on an override flag associated with an accountof the caller; and blocking the call based on the originating number ifthe call block at the exchange level of the originating number isoverridden.
 9. The method as recited in claim 1, wherein the call isblocked based on a comparison of a first field value of an origin recordassociated with an origin point of the call and a second field value ofa destination city record associated with a destination city of thecall.
 10. The device as recited in claim 5, wherein the call is blockedbased a comparison of a first field value of an origin record associatedwith an origin point of the call and a second field value of adestination city record associated with a destination city of the call,if the overriding means overrides the one or more fraud control blocks.11. The method as recited in claim 8, wherein the call is blocked basedon a comparison of a first field value of an origin record associatedwith an origin point of the call and a second field value of adestination city record associated with a destination city of the callif the call block at the exchange level of the originating number isoverridden.